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Learning from Euler. From Mathematical
Practice to Mathematical Explanation
Daniele Molinini
Équipe Rehseis (UMR 7219), Université Paris 7 (France)
Résumé : Dans son « Découverte d’un nouveau principe de mécanique »
(1750) Euler a donné, pour la première fois, une preuve du théorème qu’on
appelle aujourd’hui le Théorème d’Euler. Dans cet article je vais me concentrer
sur la preuve originale d’Euler, et je vais montrer comment la pratique mathé-
matique d’Euler peut éclairer le débat philosophique sur la notion de preuves
explicatives en mathématiques. En particulier, je montrerai comment l’un des
modèles d’explication mathématique les plus connus, celui proposé par Mark
Steiner dans son article « Mathematical explanation » (1978), n’est pas en me-
sure de rendre compte du caractère explicatif de la preuve donnée par Euler.
Cela contredit l’intuition originale du mathématicien Euler, qui attribuait à
sa preuve un caractère explicatif spécifique.
Abstract: In his “Découverte d’un nouveau principe de mécanique” (1750)
Euler offered, for the first time, a proof of the so-called Euler’s Theorem. In
this paper I will focus on Euler’s original proof and I will show how a look at
Euler’s practice as a mathematician can inform the philosophical debate about
the notion of explanatory proofs in mathematics. In particular, I will show
how one of the major accounts of mathematical explanation, the one proposed
by Mark Steiner in his paper “Mathematical explanation” (1978), is not able
to account for the explanatory character of Euler’s proof. This contradicts the
original intuitions of the mathematician Euler, who attributed to his proof a
particular explanatory character.
1 Introduction
Does philosophy of mathematics have something to do with the way mathe-
maticians do their job? Can philosophy of mathematics learn from the obser-
vation and the analysis of the way mathematics is done? As it is well known,
Philosophia Scientiæ, 16 (1), 2012, 105–127.
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a positive answer to these questions came from the philosophy of mathemat-
ics itself, with the emergence during the sixties of a strong opposition to the
classical foundational programs (logicism, Hilbert program and intuitionism).
This reaction against the “dogmas of foundationalism” [Tymoczko 1998, 95],
which started with Imre Lakatos and which has been pursued by what Aspray
and Kitcher defined as “a maverick group of philosophers” [Aspray & Kitcher
1988], gave a central importance to the history of mathematics and assumed
mathematical practice as a driving force in the philosophical research.
The research questions posed by the “maverick” philosophers were more
oriented on the heuristics of mathematics, the way in which mathemat-
ics grows, the notion of explanation in mathematics, the distinction be-
tween formal and informal proofs and reasonings in mathematics [Aspray &
Kitcher 1988, 17]. Furthermore, questions concerning the dynamics of math-
ematical discovery and the historical development of mathematics were also
addressed [Kitcher 1984].
It is without a doubt that such research questions are still urgent and cen-
tral to the agenda of contemporary philosophers of mathematics ([Mancosu,
Jørgensen & Pedersen 2005]; [Mancosu 2008]). And it can be noted that
similar claims about the importance of scientific practice in the philosophical
investigation come from the general philosophy of science. 1 But how can the
questions of the traditional philosophy of science be dissolved or moved by
the examination of scientific practice? And, for what specifically concerns the
topic touched by the present issue of this journal, how can an examination of
the practice of mathematicians help in informing topics regarding the philos-
ophy of mathematics? In this paper I will propose a possible answer to the
latter question. By focusing on the notion of mathematical explanation, I will
show that an analysis of Euler’s scientific practice does provide not only an
evaluation of a philosophical model (Steiner’s model of mathematical explana-
tion in mathematics), but it also suggests new directions of investigations that
might come out as fruitful. In this sense, the aim of the paper will be twofold:
it will provide a testing of one particular account of mathematical explana-
tion on a specific case-study; it will show that an investigation which takes
scientific practice as a starting point for philosophical analysis can have strong
repercussions on debates which are central to the contemporary philosophy of
mathematics and to philosophy of science in general.
It should be pointed out that this practice-driven methodology in the study
of the notion of explanation, i. e. a methodology according to which a theory of
explanation must be tested and refined starting from the analysis of scientific
1. For instance, in their paper on scientific understanding, Henk De Regt and
Dennis Dieks write: “Nowadays few philosophers of science will contest that they
should take account of scientific practice, both past and present. Any general charac-
teristic of actual scientific activity is in principle relevant to the philosophical analysis
of science” [De Regt & Dieks 2005, 139].
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practice itself, has been adopted by other authors as well ([Hafner & Mancosu
2008]; [Mancosu 2008]). The same methodology is welcomed by some members
of the so-called “Stanford School of History and Philosophy of Science”, notably
Nancy Cartwright and Margaret Morrison [Hoefer 2008]. These authors agree
that it is possible to have a better comprehension of mathematical explanation
focusing on particular case-studies and taking the test-case itself as a starting
point for philosophical considerations.
In this study I will focus on mathematical explanation within mathemat-
ics, leaving aside the different topic of mathematical explanation in natural
and social sciences [Mancosu 2008, 134]. But what do we refer to with the
expression ‘mathematical explanation of a mathematical fact’? To answer this
question, it is important to note that mathematical activity cannot be reduced
to a purely justificatory exercise. A great part of this activity is driven by
factors other than justificatory aims such as establishing the truth of a math-
ematical fact. In many cases, when confronted with a theorem or a problem,
the mathematician prefers a particular proof-strategy or procedure because it
provides more than a mere justification of the mathematical truth ([Kitcher
1984]; [Sandborg 1998]; [Hafner & Mancosu 2005]; [Tappenden 2005]). In
other words, that particular proof-strategy or procedure goes beyond the sim-
ple reason that ‘it makes the mathematical truth evident’. It also provides an
‘explanation’ of why that mathematical result is evident (the reason why).
As Paolo Mancosu has shown in one of his studies on explanation in
mathematics, even if there is a renewed interest on the notion of mathemat-
ical explanation, this interest does not represent a novelty in philosophy and
the attention to the topic can be traced back to Aristotle [Mancosu 2000].
Although there seems to be enough evidence that mathematical explanations
occur within mathematics, however, the notion has not been sufficiently stud-
ied and much more investigation is needed to adequately capture it. Mark
Steiner’s account of mathematical explanation, proposed by the author in his
paper “Mathematical explanation” [Steiner 1978a], represents the first explicit
contribution to the study of the notion in analytic philosophy. More precisely,
with his model Steiner attempts to account for explanations in mathematics
which come under the form of proof. 2
The outline of the paper will be the following. First of all, I will illus-
trate Steiner’s account of mathematical explanation in mathematics. Then,
in Section 3, I will concentrate on Euler’s mathematical practice and I will
present his geometrical proof of the so-called ‘Euler’s theorem’ for the exis-
tence of an instantaneous axis of rotation in rigid body kinematics. Finally, I
will evaluate Steiner’s account on this particular test-case and I will show how
2. Although “proofs are often vehicles for mathematical explanation” [Sandborg
1998, 616], not all explanations in mathematics come under this form. For cases of
explanation in mathematics which do not come under the form of proof see [Kitcher
1984], [Sandborg 1998] and [Mancosu 2001].
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the account does not consider Euler’s geometrical proof as a genuine explana-
tion, thus contradicting the intuitions of Euler himself. The final Section will
contain my conclusions.
2 Steiner’s account of explanation in
mathematics
Mark Steiner has presented his account of mathematical explanation (coming
under the form of proof) in his paper “Mathematical explanation” [Steiner
1978a]. The starting point in the building of his original approach is the
following observation: “to explain the behaviour of an entity, one deduces the
behavior from the essence or nature of the entity” [Steiner 1978a, 143]. The
previous remark is aimed to face a well-known problem: mathematical truths
are commonly regarded as necessary, then it is meaningless to speak of essential
properties of a mathematical entity. Thus, in order to escape all the difficulties
related to the definition of an essential property of a mathematical entity x,
i. e. a property x enjoys in all possible worlds, Steiner introduces the relative
notion of characterizing property :
Instead of ‘essence’, I shall speak of ‘characterizing property’, by
which I mean a property unique to a given entity or structure
within a family or domain of such entities or structures. (I take
the notion of a family or domain undefined in this paper; examples
will follow shortly.) We thus have a relative notion, since a given
entity can be part of a number of different domains or families.
Even in a single domain, entities may be characterized multiply.
[Steiner 1978a, 143]
For Steiner, an explanatory proof depends on such property, while a non-
explanatory proof does not. In particular, “an explanatory proof makes refer-
ence to a characterizing property of an entity mentioned in the theorem, such
that from the proof it is evident that the result depends on that property”
[Steiner 1978a, 143]. The dependence characterizing property-result comes
from the fact that if we try to manipulate the proof, by substituting in it a
different object of the same domain, the theorem collapses. This introduces
us to Steiner’s second core-notion about explanation by proofs: generalizabil-
ity—through the variation of a characterizing property. If we deforme the
proof by varying a certain characterizing property of a related entity, what
we obtain in response is a change of the theorem. To every deformation of
the proof there corresponds a deformation in the theorem, i. e. to an array of
proofs there corresponds an array of theorems. 3 The theorems obtained are
3. Although Steiner offers some examples, the notion of ‘deformation’ is left un-
defined in his discussion. He writes: “Deformation is similarly undefined—it implies
Learning from Euler 109
proved and explained by the deformations of the original proof. This is what
Steiner takes for an explanatory proof to be generalizable [Steiner 1978a, 143].
To sum up, Steiner offers two criteria for considering a proof being ex-
planatory:
C1 dependence on a characterizing property of an entity mentioned in the
theorem (dependence criterion)
C2 possibility to deform the proof by “substituting the characterizing prop-
erty of a related entity” and getting “a related theorem” (generalizability
criterion).
Steiner’s examples of explanatory proofs include two different proofs of the
sum of the first n integers and the proof of the irrationality of
√
2 involving
the fundamental theorem of arithmetic. In another paper, which is devoted
to the distinct topic of mathematical explanations in science, Steiner consid-
ers as explanatory a proof of a particular theorem as given in linear algebra
[Steiner 1978b]. Since the test case I am going to present in the next Section
concerns the very same theorem (as discussed by Euler), let me consider here
this example as illustrative of his account. The proof requires some familiarity
with the language of linear algebra, and therefore it is first necessary to give
some basic terminology.
An orthogonal matrixA is a real square matrix with the following property:
At = A−1 (the transpose matrix of A coincides with the inverse of A). 4 The
class of n × n orthogonal matrices is a group under matrix multiplication. 5
The group of real orthogonal n × n matrices is called the orthogonal group,
and it is denoted by O(n). The property At = A−1 clearly holds for every
real orthogonal matrix which belongs to O(n). Since AAt = I, we have:∣AAt∣ = ∣A∣∣At∣ = ∣A∣∣A∣ = ∣A∣2 = ∣I∣ = 1. 6 Thus ∣A∣ = ±1 for every member
of O(n). The subgroup of matrices with determinant +1 is called the special
orthogonal group and it is denoted by SO(n). We can regard a matrix as a
representation of a linear mapping α of the Euclidean space (α ∶ V Ð→ V ), then
n is the dimension of the space (n = dim(V )). The characteristic polynomial
Pα(t) of the linear map α ∶ V Ð→ V is the polynomial ∣A − tI∣, where A is
our matrix representation of α. The scalar λ is an eigenvalue of the linear
mapping α if and only if ∣A − λI∣ = 0 (this is a theorem), where the equation
not just mechanical substitution, but reworking the proof, holding constant the proof
idea” [Steiner 1978a, 147].
4. The inverse A−1 of A satisfies A−1A = I = AA−1. The transpose matrix of
A, denoted by At, is the matrix obtained by exchanging A’s rows and columns:(At)ij =Aji.
5. A group is a set G, together with a binary operation ∗ on G, which has the
following properties: 1) for all g and h in G, g ∗ h ∈ G; 2) for all f , g and h in
G, f ∗ (g ∗ h) = (f ∗ g) ∗ h; 3) there is an unique e in G such that for all g in G,
g ∗ e = g = e ∗ g; 4) if g ∈ G there is some h in G such that g ∗ h = e = h ∗ g.
6. We used two well-known properties of determinants: the fact that, for any
square matrix A, ∣AB∣ = ∣A∣∣B∣ and ∣At∣ = ∣A∣.
110 Daniele Molinini
∣A− λI∣ = 0 is called secular equation. An eigenvector of the transformation is
a non-null vector v that is transformed in a scalar multiple of itself: α(v) = λv.
If λ is any eigenvalue of α, the set of all vectors v of V with α(v) = λv is a
nonzero subspace of V which is called the eigenspace of λ; it consists of the
zero vector and all the eigenvectors belonging to λ. Naturally, if the eigenspace
has dimension 1, it is a line.
All the notions sketched in the previous paragraph belong to the basic
background knowledge of linear algebra and group theory. Consider now a
particular case of orthogonal matrices (or transformations): those matrices for
which the condition ∣A∣ = +1 holds, i. e. the members of the special orthogonal
group SO(n). Here is the theorem considered by Steiner, together with the
relative proof:
Theorem 1. Every matrix A ∈ SO(3), with A ≠ I3, has an eigenvalue +1.
Proof. The proof of the existence of such eigenvalue is very short and could
be stated via a speedy argument which requires no direct calculations but
only some background notions. 7 We assume A ≠ I3 because A = I3 is the
uninteresting case of the identity transformation.
Consider a real matrix A member of SO(3) and recall that for this matrix
the determinant is equal to +1. Furthermore we know that, in general, the
secular equation ∣A − λI∣ = 0 has three roots which correspond to three eigen-
values. We want to prove that one of these eigenvalues is our λ = +1.
Suppose now λ1, λ2 and λ3 are eigenvalues of A. They are the roots of a cubic
polynomial with real coefficients (the entries of the matrix are real). Thus,
according to the fundamental theorem of algebra (FTA) and the complex con-
jugate root theorem (CCRT), one of the eigenvalue (say, λ1) is real. 8 By
CCRT, if λ2 is not real, then its complex conjugate λ∗2 is also an eigenvalue
(λ3 = λ∗2). Since ∣A∣ = λ1λ2λ3, we have two possibilities for the eigenvalues:
7. This proof is that to which Steiner refers to and it is given in Goldstein’s
Classical Mechanics [Goldstein 1957, 123]. The very same proof is common in text-
books of linear algebra and group theory. For instance, see [Grove & Benson 1985].
8. The FTA states that any polynomial has at least a complex root. If we accept
the factorization of a polynomial of degree n, it has exactly n complex roots. The
CCRT says that if a polynomial in one variable with real coefficients, such as ∣A−λI∣,
has a complex root λ, then the complex conjugate λ∗ of λ is also a root of the
polynomial. This means that, according to CCRT, if λ is a solution of the polynomial
equation ∣A−λI∣ = 0, also λ∗ will be a solution of the same equation. In general, the
FTA says that ∣A − λI∣ = 0 will always have complex solutions, but not necessarily
real solutions. However, we are considering a real orthogonal 3 × 3 matrix, then the
polynomial ∣A−λI∣ is a real polynomial (the entries of the matrix A are real, and so
are the coefficients of the polynomial) of odd degree (degree 3). Thus, by FTA, the
polynomial equation ∣A − λI∣ = 0 has an odd number of solutions. Now, according to
CCRT, complex solutions come in conjugate pairs, and consequently there is an even
number of them in ∣A − λI∣ = 0. Therefore the polynomial equation ∣A − λI∣ = 0 has
at least one real solution (i. e. at least one real eigenvalue).
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a) λ1 = 1, λ2 = λ3 = ±1
b) λ1 = 1, λ2 = λ∗3 /∈R (observe here the change in notation for λ∗3)
In either case we have that +1 is an eigenvalue. 9
In his paper “Mathematics, explanation and scientific knowledge” [Steiner
1978b], Steiner considers the proof above as explanatory. How then are his cri-
teria for explanatoriness C1 and C2 supposed to operate in this case? Recall,
first of all, that for Steiner a proof is explanatory only if it makes evident
that the conclusion depends on a property of some entity or structure men-
tioned in the theorem (criterion C1). In other words, the proof must involve
a characterizing property.
Steiner’s attention in his paper is not explicitly directed to explanations
in pure mathematics, but the focus is elsewhere. 10 This is, perhaps, what
precludes him from offering a detailed description of how C1 and C2 are ful-
filled in the proof above. However, in a personal communication he suggests
that we have to “pick the characterizing property of SO(3) as having an odd
dimension”. This means that the entity (or structure) mentioned in the the-
orem is SO(3), which belongs to the family SO(n), while its characterizing
property is ‘having an odd dimension’. But in what sense then the previous
proof depends on the odd dimensionality of SO(3)? If we concentrate, as
Steiner suggests, on the proof strategy above, it is evident that the existence
of the eigenvalue λ = +1 depends on the fact that n is odd. We also agree with
Steiner that there is no necessity for any eigenvalue to be +1 [Steiner 1978a,
18], because this does not hold for all the elements of the family SO(n) (in two
or four dimensions, for instance, the number of real eigenvalues is even and the
theorem does not hold).
Second, recall that for Steiner generalizability comes when we substitute
the characterizing property of a related object and what we get is a related
deformed theorem (criterion C2). Concerning C2, then, Steiner’s idea is that
the generalizability of the proof above is obtained by replacing the dimension 3
by some odd number: “There is an explanatory proof of this [existence of
an eigenvalue +1] that extends to any Euclidean space of odd dimension”
(personal communication). It is easy to see how we can use this strategy to
get new theorems. By replacing 3 by some odd number we obtain our related
9. What interests us here is the existence of such eigenvalue. Observe, however,
that the proof given also shows that there is only one eigenvalue λ = +1. The unicity
of λ = +1 can also be proved as a corollary of the more general theorem of Cartan-
Dieudonné, by showing that the dimension of the space Fix(α) of the fixed points of
the transformation is 1 [Grove 2002, 49].
10. In this paper Steiner is mainly concerned with the existence of mathematical
explanations in science, and with the existential conclusions which follow once the
existence of such explanations is accepted.
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theorem, i. e. a theorem which states the existence of the eigenvalue +1 for
every real matrix A ∈ SO(n) with n odd. 11
After this short presentation of Steiner’s theory, in the next Section I
will concentrate on Euler and his geometrical proof of a particular result in
kinematics of rigid body motion. The theorem in which this result appears,
called Euler’s theorem after Euler, states that the general displacement of a
rigid body with a point fixed is a rotation about some axis. In other words, the
theorem says that for every rotation of a rigid body with a fixed point there
exists an instantaneous axis around which the rotation is made. 12 From an
analysis of Euler’s practice as a mathematician it will emerge that Euler looked
at his geometrical proof as a mathematical ‘explanation’ of a mathematical
truth, and not as a simple justificatory procedure.
3 Euler’s proof for the existence of an
instantaneous axis of rotation
Euler’s contributions to mechanics are numerous and of primary importance.
Among those, the use for the first time of a perpendicular Cartesian coordinate
system to describe the motion of a rigid body in his Recherches sur les corps
célestes en général [Euler 1747] and the introduction of the so-called ‘Euler
Angles’ in chapter IV of his Introductio in Analysis Infinitorum (1748), while
investigating surfaces in space. Euler was also the first to prove the existence
of an instantaneous axis of rotation in the kinematics of rigid body motion.
He obtained this result, for the first time, in his E177 Découverte d’un nouveau
principe de mécanique [Euler 1750]. 13
In E177 Euler utilizes previous results in order to study the general motion
of a rigid body with a fixed point and deduces the changes in the position and
the velocity distribution from the given forces acting on the body. His enter-
prise in the dynamics of rigid body motion in space was stimulated by the
problem of the rotation of the Earth around its axis (as to explain the preces-
sion of equinoxes). Newton had given a first explanation of the phenomenon in
book III of the Principia, while D’Alembert tried to improve Newton’s study
11. For instance, this theorem appears in Hermann Weyl’s The Classical Groups
[Weyl 1973, 58].
12. Note that the theorem seen above, used by Steiner to illustrate his account, is
just a modern algebraic formulation of Euler’s theorem, once the appropriate phys-
ical interpretation is established. This is, for instance, how the theorem appears in
Goldstein’s textbook: “The real orthogonal matrix specifying the physical motion of
a rigid body with one point fixed always has the eigenvalue +1” [Goldstein 1957, 119].
13. In 1910 and 1913, the Swedish mathematician Gustaf Eneström completed the
first comprehensive survey of Euler’s works. Each work is classified by using the letter
E and a number (the works are referred to as “Eneström number”).
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in his 1749 Recherches sur la précession des équinoxes et sur la nutation de
l’axe de la Terre [Wilson 1987]. Furthermore, Euler’s studies in hydraulics and
in the motion of ships during the 1740’s permitted him a new and different
approach to mechanics. 14 The separation of the progressive motion of the
center of gravity from the rotatory motion obtained in his Scientia Navalis
(written between 1737 and 1740, and published in 1749) is applied here in
a kinematical version and it permits Euler to reach the following conclusion:
the rotatory motion of the body is independent of its progressive motion. As
Euler affirms in the Introduction:
Quelque composé que soit le mouvement d’un corps solide, on le
peut toujours décomposer en un mouvement progressif et en un
mouvement de rotation. [. . . ] on peut entreprendre la recherche
du mouvement de rotation, tout comme si le corps n’avoit aucun
mouvement progressif. [Euler 1750, 82]
The separation of motions gives Euler the opportunity to concentrate only
on rotatory motion and state the existence of an instantaneous axis of rotation:
Supposant donc le centre de gravité d’un corps solide quelconque
en repos, ce corps sera néanmoins susceptible d’une infinité de
mouvemens différens. Or je démontrerai dans la suite, que, quel
que soit le mouvement d’un tel corps, ce sera pour chaque instant
non seulement le centre de gravité qui demeure en repos, mais il
y aura aussi toujours une infinité de points situés dans une ligne
droite, qui passe par le centre de gravité, dont tous se trouveront
également sans mouvement. [Euler 1750, 83]
In the Section Détermination du mouvement en général, dont un corps
solide est susceptible, pendant que son centre de gravité demeure en repos, in
order to study the general motion of the body, Euler introduces a Cartesian
system fixed in absolute space and assumes that a point Z of the body with
coordinates x, y, z has velocities P , Q, R in the direction of the axes. The
components of the velocity P , Q, R are functions of x, y, z. Euler’s final
purpose is to find these functions. He considers another point z “infiniment
proche du précédent Z”, of coordinates x + dx, y + dy, z + dz and velocities
P +dP , Q+dQ, R+dR. After an analytic treatment, Euler is able to conclude
that there are points, which have coordinates (Cu,−Bu,Au), that do not move
during time dt. 15 These points are on a straight line through the origin, which
is called the “instantaneous axis of rotation”. 16
14. See [Maltese 2000] on this phase of Euler’s work in mechanics, concerning the
relativity of motion.
15. The letters A, B, C stand for indeterminate coefficients.
16. Euler does not use the word instantaneous. He refers to it simply as axe de
rotation.
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[. . . ] tous les points du corps, qui sont contenus dans ces formules
x = Cu, y = −Bu, z = Au demeureront en repos pendant le temps
dt. Or tous ces points se trouvent dans une ligne droite, qui
passe par le centre de gravité O; donc cette ligne droite demeurant
immobile sera l’axe de rotation, autour duquel le corps tourne
dans le présent instant. [Euler 1750, 95]
After the analytic argument, Euler adds a purely geometric (i. e. non
analytic) proof of the existence of the instantaneous axis of rotation, discussing
the infinitesimal motion of a spherical surface with a fixed point. He embarks
on the new proof after the following remark: “Sans entrer dans le détail du
calcul, que je viens de déveloper, on peut aussi prouver la même vérité par la
seule Géométrie” [Euler 1750, 96]. Keep in mind the theorem: When a rigid
body is moved around its center it is always possible to find a line, passing
through the center, whose position is the same as before the motion. His
geometrical proof runs as follows 17:
Euler’s geometrical proof. In time dt, the rigid body with a fixed point (the
center of gravity) will have moved from one position to another. Now, con-
sider in the moving body a spherical layer (“couche sphérique”) whose center
coincides with the center of gravity (in Figure 1 I have indicated the center of
gravity with a cross ‘×’, but this point is not showed in Euler’s original dia-
gram). As Euler observes, to know the motion of the spherical surface defined
by this spherical layer amounts to determine the motion of the entire body.
If we consider an arc AB of a grand circle on the spherical surface, after
time dt it will have moved to the new position ab. Recall the body is rigid,
then AB = ab. Euler remarks that, from the study of this configuration, it will
be possible to find the positions of all the points of the spherical surface after
time dt [Euler 1750, 96].
Let’s look at the diagram (Figure 1). If we prolong the two arcs BA and
ba they will meet in a point, say C. If we take point a on the arc bcC such
that ac = AC, after time dt point C (on the arc BA) will be transported in
position c (on the arc ba), and thus the arc CAB in cab. For simplicity, call
g1 the grand circle BAC and g2 the other circle bcC. Consider now a point
M outside the grand circle g1, and trace the arc MC. After time dt the point
M will move to the new position, say m. If we want to know the position m,
we have simply to trace the arc cm = CM such that ∠acm =∠ACM .
Now, if we prolong the two arcs CM and cm, they will intersect in a point
O. Thus, after time dt, the arc CMO will be transported to the arc cmO.
If CMO = cmO, the point O will not move in time dt and will be a fixed
point. Nevertheless, to say that arcs CMO and cmO are equal amounts to
say that the spherical triangle cCO is isosceles. Therefore the problem to see
17. For a similar reconstruction see [Koetsier 2007, 184–185].
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Figure 1: Reconstruction of Euler’s original diagram as it appears in
E177.
if there exists such a fixed point O corresponds to the problem of finding a
possible configuration in which the spherical triangle cCO is isosceles. This
configuration, as Euler points out, can always be found:
Il est certain qu’on peut toujours constituer en sorte l’arc CMO,
qu’ayant décrit son arc correspondant cmO, il soit cmO = CMO.
Car pour que cela arrive on n’a qu’à constituer l’arc CMO en
sorte, que l’angle cCO devienne égal à l’angle CcO; afin que le
triangle sphérique COc devienne isoscèle et partant les côtés CO
et cO égaux entr’eux. [Euler 1750, 96]
In order the spherical triangle to be isosceles it suffices that the angles∠cCO and ∠CcO be equal. How do we choose M in the right way to obtain
this configuration? Euler’s reasoning is very simple. Consider the configura-
tion in which the angles are equal: ∠cCO =∠CcO. Observe that:
∠cCO =∠ACO −∠ACc and ∠CcO =∠180 −∠acO (4)
But we also want that
∠ACO =∠acO and ∠cCO =∠CcO (5)
Thus, by simple substitutions and addition of the angles, we have:
∠2cCO =∠180 −∠ACc (6)
116 Daniele Molinini
Figure 2: The instantaneous axis of rotation.
or
∠cCO =∠90 −∠ACc
2
(7)
The previous expression means that the angle formed by ∠cCO and ∠ACc
2
is a right angle. Hence, if we take the angular bisector γ of the angle ∠ACc,
we can conclude that, in order the spherical triangle OCc to be isosceles, point
M must be chosen such that CM be perpendicular to γ. Then O is fixed in
the motion and it belongs to a line (passing through the center of the surface)
which does not move.
Although Euler does not do this, it is immediate to see the instantaneous
axis just by tracing a line passing through the center of gravity (which is at
rest in the motion) and the point O. In Figure 2, I traced the instantaneous
axis Ir and the system of reference fixed with the rigid body before and after
the infinitesimal motion—respectively, (x0, y0, z0) and (x1, y1, z1).
Why did Euler add the previous geometrical proof if he had already ob-
tained the result via an analytic procedure? Bear in mind the mathematical
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result: there exists a line which does not move in the infinitesimal transfor-
mation. As Euler affirms, we can prove that this is true without calculations
and via geometry alone [Euler 1750, 96]. It seems then that Euler adds the
geometrical proof to convince the reader of the validity of the previous analytic
result. More precisely, as I am going to show in the next paragraph, Euler is
convinced that the geometrical procedure provides us with a kind of compre-
hension of the result (it is not mere justification). The geometrical proof has
an epistemic value that the analytic proof has not.
Even though Euler strongly contributed to the transition towards an ana-
lytical mechanics, by pushing forward the process of mathematization started
with Newton, geometrical arguments still played a crucial role in his scien-
tific practice. As an example, in his De novo genere oscillationum (presented
in 1739), in the study of what we call today ‘forced simple harmonic mo-
tion’, Euler interpreted geometrically every quantity involved in the prob-
lem. 18 This, however, should not come as a surprise. As a consequence
of the 17th century, geometrical concepts were still rooted in mechanics and
the way in which the new mechanics developed did not entirely depend on
the new mathematical techniques for conceptual support [Mahoney 1984]. In
the Preface to his Mechanica (1736), Euler points out that in reading works
such as Newton’s Principia and Hermann’s Phoronomia he had difficulties in
solving problems slightly differents from the geometrical cases presented but
he could “understand” the solutions to the particular geometrical problems
“well enough” [Euler 1736, Preface]. 19 Here Euler attributed to geometrical
proofs some specific epistemic virtue (“understanding”). 20 Observe that, while
Euler stresses that the works composed “without analysis” do not provide a
sufficient knowledge to solve problems slightly differents from a given (geo-
metrical) example, he admits that geometrical methods “persuade of the truth
of the things that are demonstrated” and lead to the comprehension of the
solution [Euler 1736, Preface]. This is exactly the case of E177: he adds the
geometrical proof because it persuades of the existence of point O (and then
of the instantaneous axis) and, furthermore, leads to the comprehension of the
solution. The analytic procedure lacks in this epistemic value. This is why
Euler’s geometrical proof marks a decisive point and it is considered by Euler
of primary importance. To prove a geometrical theorem, Euler adds to the
analytic proof a purely geometric proof. In considering a geometrical proof
for the geometrical theorem, Euler restricts the conceptual resources used to
prove the theorem to those which determine the content of the theorem, i. e.
18. Referring to this paper, Jerome Ravetz has observed: “symptomatic of his think-
ing at this stage is the description of the sine as a line, not a function” [Ravetz 1961,
13]
19. The original passage is in Latin. I adopt here the translation which appears in
[Guicciardini 2004].
20. Euler uses the Latin verb ‘percipio’, which means ‘to perceive’, ‘to understand’.
The verbal form is translated as ‘understanding’ by [Guicciardini 2004, 245].
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geometrical concepts. To put it roughly, the same geometrical concepts are
used to enunciate and prove the theorem. Therefore Euler is concerned with
‘purity of methods’. 21 And, in line with what Euler affirms in the Preface
to his Mechanica, this purity increases the epistemic quality of the proof with
respect to the analytic proof. The geometrical procedure provides us with a
kind of comprehension of the result (it is not pure justification), thus increas-
ing the epistemic quality of the proof with respect to the analytic proof. The
qualitative type of knowledge that the geometrical proof provides is the knowl-
edge of the basic reasons why the result is true. The purely geometric proof is
explanatory because, by making possible to reach the result through the same
resources which determine the content of the theorem, it provides us with the
knowledge of why the instantaneous axis exists: the axis exists because we can
easily construct it geometrically, by finding point O and tracing the line in the
diagram. Geometrical reasoning defines a natural, ‘organic’ conceptual path
which leads us from the content of the theorem to the result. This is how the
purely geometric proof sheds light on why the result is true. 22 The analytic
proof, although convincing of the correctness of the mathematical claim, does
not offer this possibility.
Let me mention how the previous case regarding the geometrical proof
in E177 does not represent an isolated example within Euler’s mathematical
activity. In 1775 Euler published E478, Formulae generales pro translatione
quacunque corporum rigidorum. Here he reconsiders the more general problem
of the description of the change of position of a rigid body. The difference
with E177 is that here Euler is dealing with an arbitrary (finite) motion.
In Section 20 of E478 Euler examines the following problem: does it exist
a straight line which has its initial and final directions parallel (before and
21. On purity of methods see [Detlefsen 2008] and [Detlefsen & Arana 2011].
Detlefsen and Arana offer the following characterization of purity: “purity in math-
ematics has generally been taken to signify a preferred relationship between the re-
sources used to prove a theorem or solve a problem and the resources used or needed
to understand or comprehend that theorem or problem. In this sense, a pure proof or
solution is one which uses only such means as are in some sense intrinsic to (a proper
understanding of) a theorem proved or a problem solved” [Detlefsen & Arana 2011,
1].
22. Although the connection purity of methods-explanation has not been suffi-
ciently investigated yet, purity and explanation are not absolutely separate matters
and the two notions seem to be closely connected [Mancosu 2011]. In particular, the
idea that purity of methods can increase the epistemic quality of the proof, and more
particularly that they can have explanatory value, has been expressed by some au-
thors (cf. [Detlefsen & Arana 2011, 7–8]). Even though in this paper I am pointing to
such connection (purity of methods-explanatory value) for the case of Euler’s E177,
it should be noted that the fact that a proof be ‘pure’ is not regarded as a necessary
condition for that proof to be explanatory. Other features of a proof, for instance
the virtue a proof has to be visualizable or its being part of a particular theory or
framework, have been considered as plausible sources of explanatory power as well
[Mancosu 2011], and this despite the ‘pure’ or ‘impure’ character of the proof.
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after the translation)? In order to search this line he tries to solve a system
of equations, but the problem is analytically too complex and he is not able
to find a solution. 23 Thus, once more, he gives a geometrical proof, similar
to that presented above. 24 Euler is convinced of the validity of his analytic
(unsolved) procedure, and thus of the existence of the line, because he has a
geometrical proof which confirms this “vérité”. Again, the geometrical proof
persuades of the truth of the things that are demonstrated. More precisely,
Euler observes how sometimes rules of analytical formulas “hide” the truth of
excellent properties such as the existence of the line under investigation:
As it thus has been seen by the most solid reasoning, that in every
translated situation there is always given such a straight line iz,
whose direction does not differ from that which the same line IZ
held in its initial situation [. . . ] On this account this excellent
property, the truth of which is so easily shown geometrically, will
be most hidden by rules of analytical formulas; and owing to this
we can anticipate the rules themselves to be the most important
advancement for the whole science of mechanics. [Euler 1775, 96]
Interestingly, at the end of his paper Euler refers to the difficulty concerning
the analytical problem and writes:
But truly nobody who is easily stunned will undertake this [an-
alytic] work; on this account this extraordinary property of all
rigid bodies is judged as much more difficult, and can provide the
best opportunity for the geometers to exercise their powers by
thoroughly explaining this property. [Euler 1775, 98] 25
To sum up, Euler informs the reader why the particular geometrical proof
was taken, beyond the simple reason that it makes the proof work. This is what
happens in the geometrical proof presented above, where the proof is given by
Euler to “easily” show the existence of the instantaneous axis. By making
obvious how the fixed point O can be found, this particular proof convinces
us of the result. Nevertheless, it provides not only a simple justification of the
result, but it also provides an explanation of why the instantaneous axis does
exist (the geometer explains this property through the conceptual instruments
of geometry). And the previous quotations show how Euler is convinced that
the (pure) geometrical proof has such particular (explanatory) virtue.
23. For a presentation of E478, see [Koetsier 2007].
24. As Koetsier has pointed out, it is possible that Euler did not realize that his
geometrical proof for the instantaneous motion, in E177, also holds for the case of
finite motion [Koetsier 2007, 185].
25. John Sten’s translation renders the Latin verb ‘enucleare’ as ‘to explain’. This
is the rendering as it is given in a standard Latin-English dictionary, as for instance
in Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short’s A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1879).
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4 Testing Steiner’s account on Euler’s proof
Steiner’s model for explanation in mathematics has been discussed by vari-
ous authors ([Resnik & Kushner 1987]; [Weber & Verhoeven 2002]; [Hafner
& Mancosu 2005]). However, a fine-grained analysis of it has been carried
out only by Resnik and Kushner [Resnik & Kushner 1987], and Hafner and
Mancosu [Hafner & Mancosu 2005]. Both the criticisms proposed by these au-
thors point to a major defect of Steiner’s account: without any constraint on
what a ‘family’ (or ‘domain’) of mathematical entities is, the choice of ‘char-
acterizing property’ in a proof is subject to arbitrariness. Furthermore, and
more interesting for what follows here, Hafner and Mancosu choose as test-
case a proof recognized as explanatory in mathematical practice, coming from
the work of Alfred Pringsheim in the theory of infinite series, and show how
Steiner’s criteria of explanatoriness fails in considering this proof as explana-
tory. Hafner and Mancosu’s moral is that Steiner’s model does not reflect the
practice of mathematicians, and for this reason must be rejected or improved
to account for the intuitions of the practicing mathematicians.
Let’s now consider Euler’s geometrical proof given in the previous Section.
If Euler’s geometrical proof is explanatory, as Euler’s mathematical practice
seems to suggest us, Steiner’s model of explanation should reflect this intuition
in recognizing it as an explanatory proof. In other words, criteria C1 and C2
should be applied successfully.
Recall Steiner’s example discussed in Section 2. 26 First of all, we must
identify the characterizing property. Steiner does not provide any precise indi-
cation on how to perform such identification, but he suggests that this property
should characterize something referred to in the theorem such that from the
proof it is evident that the conclusion depends on this property. What does
Euler’s theorem refer to? If we come back to the theorem, we can observe that
it is about a spherical surface which remains rigid in the transformation (the
distance between any two given points of the surface remains constant in the
transformation), a point which is the center of such surface and which does not
move during the transformation, and a line whose position is the same as be-
fore the transformation. Now, the object line cannot be taken into account as
an object possessing a characterizing property, and this because it represents
the result we want to prove. In fact, recall that according to Steiner the result
must depend on the characterizing property. Therefore it would be a nonsense
to say that the result depends on a characterizing property of the result itself.
It can be thought that the characterizing property is the property the surface
has to have a fixed point, or that the characterizing property is the property
the point center has to remain in the same position. The proof and the result
26. In that case, the characterizing property of SO(3) was ‘having an odd dimen-
sion’, and the generalizability of the theorem came from deforming the proof by
replacing the dimension 3 by some odd number.
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clearly depend on both these conditions. However, even if we assume that
these properties characterize uniquely the two objects spherical surface and
point—within the two families ‘spherical surfaces subject to a transformation’
and ‘points subject to a transformation’—, it is difficult to see how criterion
C2 might apply. How do we deform the proof by substituting a characterizing
property of a related entity? If we vary one of the two properties, the proof
(and thus the theorem) will collapse. And this without telling us anything
about new theorems.
On the other hand, we can turn our attention to the proof itself and ob-
serve how it depends on a great number of geometrical objects (lines, points,
angles, arcs, . . . ). Although each of those elements belongs to a family of
similar entities and can be characterized in terms of some specific property
(according to Euclidean geometry), they all contribute to the proof-strategy
and are therefore necessary to the validity of the proof. Is it possible to iden-
tify a characterizing property among those objects? Perhaps, a natural move
in the identification of the characterizing property would be to consider the
particular importance attributed by Euler to some particular step in the proof.
As we have seen above, Euler’s key step in his proof-strategy is to find a ge-
ometrical configuration in which point O has the same position before and
after the motion of the spherical surface. To find this configuration, as Euler
points out, amounts to find a configuration in which the spherical triangle
cCO is isosceles. It is obvious that the object triangle is the focus of Euler’s
proof. And it is evident that the proof, together with the result, depends on
the property this object has to be isosceles (if spherical triangle cCO were not
isosceles, point O would not be fixed in the transformation and the theorem
would collapse). This suggests that we can choose the characterizing property
of triangle cCO as that of being isosceles, i. e. as ‘having the angles ∠cCO
and ∠CcO equal’ (or, equivalently, ‘having the two sides CMO and cmO
equal’). This condition, which uniquely characterizes the triangle (it picks out
that particular triangle within the family of triangles), marks a crucial step
in Euler’s proof and then it deserves a particular attention. Unfortunately,
although this choice would reflect Steiner’s core intuition because the proof
depends on this particular property of the spherical triangle cCO, neither C1
nor his second criterion C2 can be applied. Concerning C1, the entity trian-
gle cCO is not mentioned in the theorem, and therefore this criterion is not
satisfied. Moreover, recall that, according to C2, if we deform the proof by
“substituting the characterizing property of a related entity” we get “a related
theorem”. Here the entity under investigation is a triangle, and its character-
izing property is ‘having the angles ∠cCO and ∠CcO equal’. If we consider a
related entity (another triangle), it is not clear how a substitution in its char-
acterizing property could be made. According to Euler’s constructive proof, if
we consider a spherical triangle cCO with two angles not equal, the theorem
fails to hold and we do not obtain new theorems.
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There is, however, a second object mentioned in the proof that should be
regarded as good candidate for having a characterizing property. In order the
spherical triangle OCc to be isosceles, point M must be chosen such that CM
be perpendicular to γ. It might be thought, then, that the proof depends on
the property the arc CM has to be perpendicular to the angular bisector γ. Or,
which amounts to the same thing, that the proof depends on the property the
angle formed by ∠cCO and ∠ACc
2
has to be a right angle. Although they both
represent reasonable choices for a characterizing property, and they uniquely
characterize the theorem, even in this case the proof would not meet Steiner’s
criteria. The two entities (the arc CM and the angle formed by ∠cCO and∠ACc
2
) are not mentioned in the theorem, contrary to what is demanded by
C1. Furthermore, it is not clear how the deformability criterion C2 is supposed
to operate. How do we pick out a related entity with a replaced characterizing
property? Again, it seems that Steiner’s criterion C2 cannot be applied simply
because it is not possible to deform the proof in his sense.
My choices above were motivated by the fact that the individuation of
a configuration in which the spherical triangle OCc be isosceles represents a
crucial step in Euler’s proof strategy. If there is a characterizing property, it is
reasonable to concentrate on that step. Furthermore, this well reflects Steiner’s
idea about the dependence characterizing property-result: it must be evident,
from the proof, that the result depends on the characterizing property. There
are, of course, others objects in the proof which can be picked out as entities
possessing a specific characterizing property. For instance, the property angles∠cCO and ∠CcO have according to the expression (4), or the property the
grand circle AB has to remain unaffected in length when moved to the new
position ab. However, even if we consider these possibilities, Steiner’s criterion
C1 is not satisfied (the entities in question are not mentioned in the theorem)
and it is hard to see how C2 might be applied. Neither the theorem nor
our proof seems to be ‘deformable’, in Steiner’s sense, to yield genuinely new
results. It is not possible to deform the proof by “holding constant the proof
idea” [Steiner 1978a] and getting something like the new theorem that we
found in Steiner’s example of Section 2.
Let me summarize the results of this Section. For the proof to count as
explanatory in Steiner’s sense it must make plain that criterion C1 and C2
are satisfied. Although the choice of characterizing property in Euler’s proof
seems to be extremely subject to arbitrariness, as previous criticisms to the
model have shown ([Resnik & Kushner 1987]; [Hafner & Mancosu 2005]), I
have considered some possible candidates. My choice was motivated by the
importance that a property of some geometrical objects has in Euler’s proof
strategy. However, neither criterion C1 nor criterion C2 apply for these char-
acterizing properties, thus blocking Steiner’s theory from recognizing the proof
as explanatory. Surely other possibilities might be considered, but a general
observation seems to show the inapplicability of the model for the particular
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test-case: Euler’s constructive proof is about a particular result and it seems
that no deformation of it will tell us anything about new theorems. The moral
is that Steiner’s account fails in considering this proof as explanatory and this
contrasts with Euler’s intuitions as a mathematician. 27 Obviously, the pre-
vious considerations shift the burden of the proof to Steiner. If his theory
of explanation is right, Steiner must show that it is able to recognize Euler’s
geometrical proof as an explanatory proof.
5 Conclusions and perspectives
If my analysis is correct, Steiner’s model cannot account for the explanatory
character of the geometrical proof given by Euler and therefore it should be
refined or even rejected in favour of a different approach. Perhaps, the lesson
we learn from Euler is that new directions of investigations are needed to
adequately capture the notion of mathematical explanation. We have seen
that Euler appealed to geometry to show why a particular geometrical result
is true. Moreover, I pointed to the crucial role that Euclidean geometry, and
more precisely a pure (geometrical) method, played in his explanatory practice.
This suggests that it might be more philosophically profitable to abandon
Steiner’s idea that an explanatory proof depends on a particular property of an
entity mentioned in the theorem in favour of an approach which focuses on the
preferences expressed by the mathematicians for some mathematical concepts
or for the particular mathematical framework used to prove a theorem. On the
other hand, it might be thought that the notion of explanatory proof cannot
be captured simpliciter, as Steiner proposes, but that there is a variety of
explanatory proof-practices in mathematics. In this sense, Euler’s practice
would represent just an example of such practices.
It would be interesting to pursue these issues here, but that is obviously
something which represents a fertile terrain for another study. Rather, the
modest aim of this paper was to show that Steiner’s theory has difficulties
in accounting for a case of genuine mathematical explanation. Furthermore,
and more important for the ambitions of the present thematic issue, I hope
to have provided an example of how mathematical practice can inform the
philosophy of mathematics. About 250 years passed by, however we can still
learn from Euler.
27. Note that in considering Euler’s geometrical proof as a mathematical expla-
nation I did not endorse any particular account of mathematical explanation, such
as Steiner’s. The fact that this is a mathematical explanation comes from Euler’s
practice as a mathematician and physicist, as I showed in the previous Section.
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